The importance of clinical reasoning in the training of all medical practitioners Sam Leinster 1 presents a very well-argued case for more generalists and describes clearly some of the barriers in the way of change. He states that 'All doctors are taught general consultation and clinical reasoning skills' but, while the first part is true, I wonder about the second. I am happy to be corrected, but my understanding is that only a minority of UK medical schools have curricula that incorporate formal teaching of clinical reasoning as we now understand it. Its inclusion in postgraduate training may not be much better.
Although there is still no consensus on a single best way to teach and learn the cognitive processes and errors that affect our decisions, there is growing recognition that effective clinical reasoning is vital for accurate and safe diagnosis and management. 2 Strangely, the General Medical Council's key publication 'Tomorrow's Doctors' makes no mention of clinical reasoning in its recommendations for education and training. 3 Acquiring clinical reasoning skills early can help doctors to make the most of the, often limited, clinical experience available in relatively short training programmes. Arguably, it is skill in clinical reasoning that underpins generalist expertise although wide experience is also essential. It may be that some will choose a generalist role before becoming specialists and others will choose the opposite path; ensuring that clinical reasoning is taught properly to all medical students and doctors might help both groups.
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Response to 'Reducing risks to the unborn child'
Perhaps it was unintentional, but this editorial raises some potentially unacceptable policies. Those of us committed to a life course approach to improving the health of populations would share the concerns of Currey et al. 1 about the early antecedents of later mortality and morbidity. However, we would firmly disagree with their strategy.
Protection of young women (and young men) from the environmental threats described by the authors should be universal and not dependent on being pregnant. Such a strategy would assure protection of the fetus while improving the health of a far larger group and affecting future pregnancies. Elevating the value of the fetus above that of the mother has untoward consequences, as we on this side of the Atlantic well know.
Such approaches permit, even encourage, abusive treatment of pregnant women and abrogation of their human rights in the name of protecting the 'unborn child'. Their language dovetailing with that routinely used by our 'pro-life (read anti-abortion)' advocates is chilling. Is the death of a young Bangladeshi woman more tragic because she was pregnant than all the other deaths of young women in the factory fires? Being pregnant should not determine access to appropriate public health interventions.
